In service: 10-8 Vol.17: Iss.3, 2017 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada.
Be Smart & Stay Safe Volume 17 Issue 3
IN SERVICE: 10-8
The term “reasonable grounds” is, in many 
cases, fundamental to police decision-
making and is the catalyst that often 
animates police powers and thereby deprives 
an individual of their constitutional freedoms 
(eg. detention, arrest, search and seizure, 
breath demands and use of force). Similarly, the lack of 
reasonable grounds may also drive the low visibility, non-court 
litigated decisions of the police not to search, arrest, or detain. 
In the context of an arrest, the arrest itself may be the trigger that 
sets in motion the process for the production of incriminating 
fruits that may have a  significant impact on the determination of 
an arrestee’s legal guilt. For example, a successful arrest may lead 
to a lawful search incidental to that arrest and the results of the 
search may reveal the evidence necessary to sustain a 
conviction. As this example illustrates, a  valid arrest can be 
pivotal to a successful prosecution. This leaves a police officer’s 
arrest and the reasonable  grounds upon which it was based as 
fertile soil for a defence lawyer to plough. It is not uncommon in 
courtrooms across Canada for a defence lawyer to attack an 
officer’s grounds for an arrest in the hopes a judge will find it 
unlawful, the resulting search incidental to it unreasonable, and 
open the door for the exclusion of evidence and ultimately an 
acquittal. 
Interestingly, there is no statutory definition for reasonable 
grounds found in the Criminal Code or other similar statutes. 
There are, however, many judicial decisions where courts have 
tried to explain the meaning of this term, whether it relates to 
belief or suspicion. Police officers, lawyers, and judges alike 
must therefore  look to case law, and in many respects common 
sense, to understand its meaning. This issue of “In Service: 10-8” 
is full of appellate level cases which discuss this important 
concept. Enjoy the read!
REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
“The power to 
arrest is only 
available when 
the officer 
subjectively 
believed he had 
reasonable and 
probable 
grounds to do so. 
In addition, 
those grounds 
must be justified 
from an 
objective point 
of view, as 
assessed from 
the standpoint of 
the reasonable 
person.”
R. v. Ngai, 2017 ABCA 199
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Ask more: the power of questions to open doors, 
uncover solutions, and spark change.
Frank Sesno.
New York, NY: AMACOM (2017).
BF 637 C45 S474 2017
Crunch time: how to be your best when it matters 
most.
Rick Peterson & Judd Hoekstra.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers (2017).
BF 637 S8 P468 2017
Cultural intelligence: surviving and thriving in the 
global village.
David C. Thomas and Kerr Inkson.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers (2017).
HM 1211 T486 2017
Eat that f rog! : 21 great ways to s top 
procrastinating and get more done in less time.
Brian Tracy.
Oakland, CA:Berrett-Koehler Publishers, (2017).
BF 637 P76 T73 2017
Getting things done: the art of stress-free 
productivity.
David Allen.
New York, NY: Penguin Books, (2017).
BF 637 T5 A45 2015
How to run seminars and workshops : 
presentation skills for consultants, trainers, 
teachers, and salespeople.
Robert Jolles.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., (2017).
AS 6 J65 2017
How you learn is how you live: using nine ways of 
learning to transform your life.
Kay Peterson, Experience Based Learning Systems, 
David A. Kolb, Institute for Experiential Learning.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, (2017).
BF 318.5 P47 2017
Interpersonal communication: relating to others.
Steven A. Beebe, Susan J. Beebe, Mark V. Redmond 
& Lisa Salem-Wiseman.
Don Mills, ON: Pearson Canada Inc., (2017).
BF 637 C45 I68 2017
Marijuana and mental health.
Edited by Michael T. Compton, M.D., M.P.H.
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association 
Publishing, (2016).
C 568 C2 M376 2016
Rapid media development for trainers: creating 
videos, podcasts, and presentations on a budget.
Jonathan Halls.
Alexandria, VA: ATD Press, (2017).
HF 5549.5 T7 H355 2017
Research methods in crime and justice.
Brian L. Withrow.
New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
(2017).
HV 6024.5 W58 2016
Stop guessing: the 9 behaviors of great problem 
solvers.
Nat Greene.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, (2017).
BF 449 G74 2017
Your perfect right: assertiveness and equality in 
your life and relationships
Robert E. Alberti, PhD ; Michael L. Emmons, PhD.
Oakland, CA: Impact Publishers, (2017).
BF 575 A85 A43 2017 
You've got 8 seconds: communication secrets for 
a distracted world.
Paul Hellman.
New York, NY: AMACOM, (2017).
HD 30.3 H437 2017
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CO-HABITANT CAN CONSENT 
TO POLICE ENTRY
R. v. Reeves, 2017 ONCA 365
The accused lived in a home for 10 
years with his common-law spouse 
and his two teenage daughters. He 
was a co-owner and contributed to 
the mortgage payments. He was 
charged with domestic assault and had a no 
contact order with his spouse, which required him 
to stay away from the home unless he had his 
spouse’s written consent. He was subsequently 
arrested and held in custody. The next day, his 
spouse called his parole officer to revoke consent 
for him to visit the home. At the same time, she told 
the parole officer that the accused had child 
pornography on the family computer. A police 
officer went to the home and obtained a signed 
consent from his spouse for the warrantless seizure 
of the computer.  The accused and his spouse were 
“joint owners” of the computer and protected it 
with a password that was available to each of them. 
The police subsequently obtained a warrant to 
search the computer. They found 140 images and 
22 videos of child pornography. The accused was 
charged with possessing and accessing child 
pornography. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused successfully had the child 
pornography excluded as evidence 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter. Among 
other Charter issues, the judge found 
the police violated the  accused’s s. 8 right by 
seizing the computer from his home that he shared 
with his spouse. Although the judge found the 
spouse freely consented to both the search of the 
home and seizure of the computer, he held she 
could not, as a third party, consent to the search or 
otherwise  waive the constitutional protection of s. 8 
on behalf of the accused. In the judge’s view, the 
officer knew or should have known that he did not 
have the  accused’s consent to enter the residence 
and remove the computer. The evidence obtained 
from the computer, including the results of the 
forensic examination, its files and its hard drive, 
was excluded. The accused was acquitted. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s ruling arguing, among 
other things, that he erred in 
finding that the accused’s 
spouse could not consent to the seizure of the 
computer and erred in excluding the evidence. 
Consent 
The Crown submitted that where two or more 
people have an equal and overlapping privacy 
interest in a residence, any of the co-habitants 
could validly  consent and the  police  do not need to 
obtain the consent from each co-habitant. The 
accused, on the other hand, suggested that one 
resident could not consent to a search or seizure on 
behalf of all residents. 
Justice LaForme, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
first outlined a number of considerations in 
addressing the issue of spousal or co-habitant 
consent searches:
• A valid consent is a waiver that immunizes a 
search or seizure from challenge under s. 8.
• Consent must be fully informed and voluntary.
• Consent must come from the right person. 
“The person who consents must be the person 
whose rights are engaged,” said Justice 
LaForme. “Someone else cannot waive your s. 
8 rights for you.” 
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• The weight of trial court jurisprudence 
suggests a contextual test –  a co-resident can 
usually consent to a search of the common 
areas, but not the private areas of another 
resident, such as his or her bedroom or 
dresser.
The Court of Appeal found the question was not 
whether one resident could waive the  constitutional 
rights of another. Instead, the question was what 
impact, if any, the fact of joint residency had on 
one’s expectation of privacy, assessed in the totality 
of circumstances. Justice LaForme stated:
At a high level of generality, the fact of co-
residency is clearly relevant to reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Descriptively, a co-
resident knows from the outset that the other 
co-resident has the right to invite 
others into shared spaces. Further, 
normatively, it would not be 
reasonable for one resident to 
expect that the other co-resident 
could never invite an agent of the 
state into the residence. In fact, one 
could reasonably expect that the 
other might have a legitimate 
interest in consenting to entry by 
law enforcement into common 
spaces from time to time. Of 
course, by the same token, one would not 
reasonably expect police entry without the 
consent of another co-resident.  And certainly 
the facts and circumstances of the case – 
including the nature of living arrangements – 
will shape the reasonable expectations of co-
residents.
In other words, in the co-residency context, 
consent by a co-resident other than the accused 
is not relevant as a form of waiver. Rather, it is 
relevant as part of determining whether the 
police have intruded upon a reasonable 
expectation of privacy held by the accused.
Therefore, in my view, the inquiry is two-
staged: (a) would the accused reasonably 
expect that his or her co-resident would have 
the power to consent to police entry into a 
common space, and (b) if so, did the co-
resident actually consent? Of course, the 
specific facts and circumstances will drive the 
answer to both of those questions. 
Before moving on, two final notes about 
consent. First, an accused does not reasonably 
expect the police to be able to enter without 
the valid, voluntary and informed consent of a 
co-resident. Nor does an accused reasonably 
expect police to go beyond the scope of 
consent provided by the co-resident in entering 
the space. Where the police do so without 
justification, the accused’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy will be violated.
Second, in my view, the analysis I 
have described also applies with 
respect to consent to seizure of 
jointly owned property within a 
shared residence, though different 
circumstances may call for a 
different analytical approach, and 
discrete issues of seizure may raise 
different questions of reasonable 
expectation. [paras. 48-52]
In this case, the warrantless search of the jointly-
owned home and the  seizure of the jointly-owned 
computer was lawful. The accused’s expectation of 
privacy in the shared spaces of the family home 
and in the family computer was greatly 
diminished. He could not access the home except 
with his spouse’s permission and she had revoked 
her consent in a phone call to the parole officer. 
Furthermore, he had been arrested the day before 
and was still in custody. As for the accused’s 
expectation of privacy  in the computer, seizing it 
did not interfere with any heightened expectation 
of privacy in its informational content. “In light of 
the history  and legal status between them, it would 
“The person who 
consents must be the 
person whose rights 
are engaged. Someone 
else cannot waive your 
s. 8 rights for you.”
“Descriptively, a co-resident knows from the outset that the other co-resident has the 
right to invite others into shared spaces. Further, normatively, it would not be reasonable 
for one resident to expect that the other co-resident could never invite an agent of the 
state into the residence.”
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have been within [the accused’s] reasonable 
expectations that [his spouse] might have a 
legitimate interest in consenting to police access to 
the shared space and property,” said Justice 
LaForme. “It was not reasonable for [the accused] 
to expect [his spouse] would not be  able to consent 
to police entry into the  common areas of the home 
or to the taking of the shared computer.”
The trial judge erred in finding the accused’s spouse 
could not consent to the search of the shared areas 
of the home and the seizure of the  computer by 
police. The spouse’s consent was valid. It was both 
voluntary and informed. The officer told the spouse 
that he was responding to the call she had made 
when she reported seeing child pornography on the 
family computer. The officer then satisfied himself 
an offence had been committed and the spouse 
signed a consent form granting permission to enter 
the residence and search it and its contents, which 
were owned and/or controlled by the spouse, and 
seize  anything or arrest any person that was 
believed to be relevant to this investigation. The 
officer did not search any area of the home nor did 
he seize any additional property. Once he obtained 
the computer, he locked it up and did not search it 
until a warrant was obtained.
s. 24(2) Charter
Since the trial judge focused heavily on the issue of 
third party consent in his s. 24(2) analysis, a 
fresh  consideration on the admissibility  of the 
evidence was necessary. Although there were other 
s. 8 breaches in this case, society had an extremely 
strong interest in the evidence being placed before 
a court. If the evidence was admitted, the 
administration of justice would not be brought into 
disrepute. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the exclusionary 
order set aside and a new trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: This decision only dealt with the 
warrantless search of the jointly-owned home and 
the seizure of a jointly-owned computer. It did not 
address a search of the computer and the seizure of 
its stored information and data belonging to the 
accused. 
MORE ON THIRD-PARTY 
CONSENT TO ENTER
It would seem that the trial 
judge in Reeves misapplied 
the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s ruling in R. v. 
Cole, 2012 SCC 53. In 
Cole, the Supreme Court 
of Canada found that the 
school board could not 
validly consent to a  search or 
otherwise  waive the constitutional 
protection of its employee in the context of an 
employer-provided computer. In Reeves, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that the accused’s 
spouse, as a co-habitant, was not entitled to waive 
his s. 8 Charter protections. However, it was the 
accused and his spouse’s co-habitation that 
impacted the accused’s reasonable  expectation of 
privacy in the shared home which would determine 
whether the accused’s spouse could consent to the 
police entry into the home without breaching the 
accused's s. 8 right. The trial judge did not look at 
the impact of this co-residency relationship on the 
accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
reasoning  led the Ontario Court of Appeal to 
develop the following two stage enquiry:
1. Would the accused reasonably  expect that his 
spouse, as a co-resident, would have the 
power to consent to police entry into a 
common space; and 
2. If the answer to the first question is yes, did 
the accused’s spouse actually consent? 
“[T]he inquiry is two-staged: (a) would the accused reasonably expect that his or her 
co-resident would have the power to consent to police entry into a common space, and 
(b) if so, did the co-resident actually consent?
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The Reeves reasoning is consistent with the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal’s approach in R. v. 
R.M.J.T., 2014 MBCA 36. In R.M.J.T., the police 
approached the accused’s wife and requested her 
consent for the seizure of the accused’s computer 
during an investigation into sexual offences. The 
wife agreed, officers were shown the computer in 
the family home and seized it. Police subsequently 
obtained a warrant to search the computer and 
found fragments of sexually explicit emails. The 
accused was charged with several offences 
inc lud ing sexua l a s sau l t , mak ing ch i ld 
pornography, possessing child pornography, and 
inviting sexual touching.
 
A Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench judge found 
the seizure  of the computer by police did not 
infringe the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights. The 
accused’s wife lawfully consented to the police 
entry  into the home and the  warrantless seizure of 
the accused’s computer was then justified under s. 
489(2) of the Criminal Code. The accused was 
convicted of several sex-related offences.
The accused then argued, before the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal, that his wife could not consent to 
the police entering the family home to seize  his 
computer. The Court of Appeal noted this case was 
not about whether the accused’s wife could 
consent to the police searching the contents of his 
computer (where he had a very high expectation of 
privacy in the information it contained), but 
whether she could consent to the police entering 
the family  residence where the computer was 
located. The Court of Appeal found the police entry 
was authorized. The accused’s wife lived in the 
home, she  had the  authority to provide consent to 
enter the area where the computer was located (a 
shared area of the home) and, as found by the trial 
judge, she provided informed consent. 
In Tymkin v. Ewatski et al., 2014 MBCA 4, the 
plaintiff sued the police for malicious prosecution, 
false imprisonment and battery. The police had 
entered a dwelling house in the middle of the night 
to arrest the plaintiff for a domestic assault against 
his former wife. When they knocked on the door, 
an occupant opened it and allowed the police to 
enter. It turned out, however, that the occupant 
answering the door was merely an overnight guest. 
The Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench nevertheless 
found the arrest to be lawful.  
The plaintiff challenged the trial judge’s conclusion 
before the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the 
warrantless arrest within the dwelling house was 
lawful. Justice Monnin, in dissent but on this point 
agreed with by the majority, found consent was an 
exception to the need for a Feeney warrant for an 
arrest in a dwelling  house.  Such consent to enter 
need not be given by the arrestee, but could be 
given by someone within the home. Justice Monnin 
stated:
Where police seek to rely upon a consent to 
enter the premises to effect an arrest, they must 
rely upon a valid one.  The requirements for a 
valid consent include that:
a) it must be given by someone who has a 
privacy interest in the premises ...; and
b) the consent must be an informed one. 
However, in this case, the person answering the 
door could not waive the  privacy interests of the 
occupants in allowing entry for the purposes of an 
arrest because he was simply an overnight guest 
and not a person with a reasonable  expectation of 
privacy. “In order to gain entry and to effect an 
arrest without a warrant, [the police] had to obtain 
the informed consent of an individual with a 
sufficient privacy interest to allow them to do so,” 
said Justice Monnin.  
In R. v. Squires, 2005 NLCA 51 leave to appeal 
dismissed [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 561, a pre-Cole 
case, the police  arrived at the accused’s apartment, 
that he shared with his common law wife. Although 
not under arrest, the police  took the accused to the 
police detachment to be interviewed about a 
murder. He had been with the victim the same day 
she had been found dead. Another officer stayed at 
the apartment and questioned the accused’s wife. 
When she told him that the accused had worn a 
striped shirt, the officer asked to see it. She  showed 
him into their  bedroom where he examined the 
shirt and noticed a  stain that looked like  blood. The 
officer sealed the apartment, applied for a search 
warrant and the blood-stained shirt was seized. A 
forensic analysis indicated that the  shirt had three 
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stains of the victim’s blood. The accused was 
subsequently charged with first degree murder.
A Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador 
judge found the accused’s wife’s consent allowing 
the officer to conduct the warrantless search of the 
apartment to inspect the shirt was not informed 
consent and, in any event, his wife did not have the 
right in the circumstances to waive the accused’s s. 
8 Charter rights. The judge then excised the 
material based upon this search from the warrant’s 
ITO. However, the evidence was admitted under s. 
24(2) and the  accused was convicted of first degree 
murder.
An appeal by the accused to the  Newfoundland 
and Labrador Court of Appeal was unsuccessful. 
Although the  trial judge’s decision respecting the 
validity of the common law wife’s consent was left 
unchallenged, the Court of Appeal offered the 
following comment in its determination of the trial 
judge’s s. 24(2) analysis:
The trial judge held that [the accused’s wife] 
did not have the right to waive [the accused’s] 
s. 8 Charter rights, i.e. that she could not 
authorize a search of the bedroom. ... I 
respectfully disagree.   A spouse, or co-habitant 
of a personal residence, can authorize the 
police to search areas of a personal residence 
which are shared in common with that person’s 
spouse or co-habitant. ... [references omitted, 
para. 34]
In R. v. Blinch (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 346 
(B.C.C.A.), the accused’s wife left the family home 
without telling him and went to be with her 
parents’ who lived out of province. Upon leaving, 
she gave a house key to a neighbour. She did not 
ask the neighbor to do anything in relation to the 
house but asked her to send things from the house 
which she might have forgotten. 
About a  week later, the accused told the neighbor 
he was going to see his wife, but not to tell his wife 
he was leaving. He asked the neighbour to feed the 
dog, which did not involve going inside the home, 
and told her that he had left an envelope on the 
table. The neighbour notified the accused’s wife. At 
the request of the accused’s wife, the neighbour 
went inside the home to check if any guns were 
missing. The neighbour found a gun missing and a 
will on the table. The neighbour called the 
accused’s wife and told her what she had found. 
The accused’s wife promptly called the police. 
Police attended the accused’s home and spoke to 
the neighbour. The neighbour unlocked the house 
and the police went inside for about 10 minutes. 
While inside, police saw various guns and a will on 
the kitchen table. Police left the home, obtained a 
search warrant and later seized the will, several 
firearms and ammunition.  
A British Columbia Supreme Court judge found  the 
neighbour had “authority” to enter the residence 
from both the accused and his wife. He also found 
that the police determined they  had the  neighbour’s 
authority to enter the residence. The judge 
concluded that the police entered with “lawful 
permission”. There  was no s. 8 Charter breach and 
the accused was convicted of possessing a weapon 
dangerous to the public.
The accused appealed this ruling to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal. He argued that the 
neighbour could not waive his rights under the 
Charter to be secure  from unreasonable search and 
seizure. The Court of Appeal agreed. It held that the 
neighbour could not give  effective consent for the 
police to search the accused’s home, even in 
circumstances where the neighbour had earlier 
entered the home at the request of the accused’s 
wife. Of note, the accused’s wife had not given the 
neighbour any instructions about allowing, or not 
allowing, police officers into the house.
A Final Thought
The Reeves case, and others, is an important 
commentary on the law of co-occupant consent 
searches. It is important to understand that one 
person cannot waive the s. 8 Charter rights of 
another. However, the relationship of co-residency 
changes privacy expectations such that one person 
may be able to allow police entry  without violating 
the rights of another. This is an important 
distinction. It will be interesting to see how courts 
use this analysis to new cases moving forward.
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TRUNK & KNAPSACK SEARCH 
PROPER AS AN INCIDENT TO 
IMPAIRED ARREST
R. v. Pearson, 2017 ONCA 389
On January 14, 2008, a  man was 
killed after being shot in the back with 
a shotgun. The following day, January 
15, the police stopped the accused 
driving his car. The officer was 
concerned about impaired driving given the 
manner in which the  car was operated. When he 
approached the driver’s side of the car, the officer 
noticed the accused’s eyes were  unusually red. His 
pupils were dilated and the officer smelled burnt 
marijuana. The accused was slow in retrieving  his 
papers and failed field sobriety tests. The officer 
arrested the accused for impaired driving and 
searched the vehicle, 
finding two shotgun 
shells in a knapsack 
in the trunk. These 
were seized.
On January 27 another man was killed. He too had 
been killed with a shotgun. On February 19, the 
accused was again stopped by police. The vehicle 
he was driving  had tinted windows. There was also 
a passenger in the vehicle. The officer saw a red 
shotgun shell in plain view on the  back  seat. The 
accused and his passenger were arrested for 
careless storage of ammunition. A search of the 
vehicle revealed three more shotgun shells in the 
trunk. The  accused was cautioned and he asked to 
speak to his lawyer. Before he could exercise his 
right to speak to counsel, however, the officer 
approached the accused, holding the shotgun shells 
in his hand and asked: “Where did these come 
from?” The accused said that he had found them 
and intended to use them to make firecrackers. 
Then, while in the back of the police car on the 
way to the police station, the accused asked the 
officer if his friend had been arrested. When told 
that the friend had also been charged with careless 
storage of ammunition, the accused blurted out that 
the ammunition was his, thereby taking ownership 
of it. 
On March 20, a detective spoke to the accused’s 
lawyer advising him that the accused’s name had 
come up in an investigation and that the police 
wanted to speak to him. On March 24, a detective 
met with the accused and drove him to the police 
station for a recorded interview. He was told he did 
not need to speak  with police and that he was 
neither detained nor charged. He said he had 
spoken to a lawyer before coming in, told police he 
did not kill either victim and was prepared to 
submit to a  polygraph test. Then, on April 15, after 
some discussion between the police and the 
accused, he was given the polygraph test that he 
requested. A detective explained the process and 
confirmed that the accused did not have to speak 
with police and could leave whenever he wanted. 
He was also told that the results of the polygraph 
could not be used in court but his comments made 
during it could be used. He was also advised that, if 
it was determined he killed the victim, he would be 
charged with murder. The accused understood and 
also signed a consent form. During the interview 
and polygraph, the accused admitted to being 
present at both killings but said he was not the 
shooter. The interview ended with the accused 
asking to speak to a lawyer, receiving  legal advice 
and refusing to speak further with police. He was 
subsequently charged with both murders. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the January 15 traffic 
stop and impaired driving arrest were 
lawful. The purpose of the trunk and 
knapsack search was to locate evidence 
helpful to the impaired driving offence. As a result, 
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the search of the car was lawful as an incident to 
the accused’s impaired driving arrest. As for the 
February 19 roadside statements, the  judge 
excluded the accused’s response to the officer’s 
question because his right to counsel had been 
violated. However,  the  judge found the second 
statement claiming ownership of the shotgun shells 
was made spontaneously without prompting by the 
officer, who was driving the police car at the 
time.  Forensically, the shotgun shells seized from 
the accused were similar to those used in both 
killings. This evidence could be used at the  murder 
trials.
As for the April 15 polygraph and interview, the 
judge found the accused made his statements 
voluntary. He was not deprived of an operating 
mind and his right to silence was not overborne by 
police. The judge also rejected the accused’s 
argument that his statement was made involuntarily 
because  police suspected him of the murder, had 
reasonable grounds to believe he had committed it 
and failed to caution him again. In the judge’s view, 
the absence of a caution was not decisive, but may 
be a factor in assessing whether or not a statement 
was voluntarily made. Had the accused become a 
suspect, with the police intending  to charge him 
with murder, his “jeopardy would have changed 
dramatically  and he would be entitled to be 
advised of that change along with a caution and 
advice of Charter rights to speak with a lawyer.” But 
that is not what happened. The accused was 
convicted of the two separate murders by two 
different juries at two separate trials.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions arguing, in part, 
that the search of his car on 
January 15 was not incidental 
to his arrest for impaired driving and therefore the 
shotgun shells found in it should have been 
excluded as evidence. Second, he asserted that the 
statements he made to police during the second 
vehicle stop on February 19 while he was sitting  in 
the back seat of a  police car should have been 
excluded because the  police breached his right to 
counsel under s. 10(b). Finally, he suggested that 
What the trial judge said about the 
vehicle search on January 15:
• “In light of the fact that the charge was impaired 
driving by a drug, i.e. marihuana, it was reasonable 
for the officer to think drugs might be found in the 
vehicle.” [para. 28]
• “When a person is arrested, police may conduct a 
search as part of the arresting process. The defence 
takes the position that searching the whole vehicle in 
the circumstances of this case would not be a search 
incident to the arrest of [the accused]. On the 
contrary, I  think that a search of the vehicle for 
drugs was reasonable when the person arrested for 
impaired driving has been arrested for impairment 
by a drug.” [para. 30]
• “With [the accused], the vehicle search was not a 
fishing expedition. Rather, it was purposeful. That 
purpose was to locate evidence that would be helpful  
to the impaired driving offence. The impaired driving 
accusation was that the impairment was the result of 
using a drug.” [para. 34]
• “Since the search of the vehicle is lawful and incident 
to arrest, the seized shotgun shells are lawfully 
seized.” [para. 35]
R. v. Pearson, 2011 ONSC 1913
What the trial judge said about the 
vehicle search on February 19:
• “[The officer] had justification to stop a car driven 
with windows darkened too much for the provisions 
of the Highway Traffic Act. ... [T]he officer saw a 
shotgun shell on the back seat.  The Criminal Code 
provides for safe storage of ammunition. In detaining 
and expecting to charge the driver and occupants 
with a  charge of improper storage of ammunition, 
searching the vehicle incident to arrest is reasonable. 
Therefore, searching the car is valid. The detention 
was reasonable when the officer saw the tinted 
windows. Further detention when ammunition is in 
plain view is reasonable. There would be reasonable 
and probable grounds to anticipate more 
ammunition and/or guns would be in the car 
including in the trunk.” [para. 20]
R. v. Pearson, 2011 ONSC 1912
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his statements to police on April 15 should not 
have been admitted because they were not 
voluntarily made.
Search Incident to Arrest
The accused contended that the search conducted 
incidental to his arrest went too far. In his view, 
searching the trunk, and the knapsack found in it, 
for evidence related to the impaired driving offence 
was unreasonable. In his view the search should 
have been confined to the area close to the driver’s 
seat. But the Court of Appeal disagreed:
The arrest of the [accused] for impaired driving 
was lawful. The search was undertaken to look 
for marijuana and by a police officer who was 
not involved a t a l l in the homicide 
investigations. Discovery of marijuana in the 
trunk of the [accused’s] car and in his knapsack 
would have some probative value on the issue 
of whether his ability to drive was impaired by 
marijuana. There was a reasonable basis for the 
officer’s actions and a reasonable prospect of 
finding evidence of the offence for which the 
[accused] had been arrested. [references 
omitted, para. 26] 
The Roadside Statement
The accused suggested that the statement in the 
back of the police  car was tainted by the violation 
of his Charter rights when the officer posed a 
question before he could consult counsel. Justice 
Pardu, however, found the accused’s spontaneous 
utterance was not “obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by this Charter” within the meaning of 
s. 24(2). “Given [the trial judge’s factual findings 
that the [accused’s] statement that the shotgun 
shells were his own was made spontaneously, out 
of concern for his friend, and that the statement 
was not prompted by any investigative step on the 
part of police, I am satisfied that the connection 
between the  Charter breach and the statement 
made from the back seat of the police car was 
tenuous and remote,” she said. 
Polygraph and Interview      
The Court of Appeal deferred to the trial judge’s 
conclusion that the accused was not a suspect on 
March 24 and had not become one until he was 
detained at the end of the April 15 interview. Up 
until then, the police did not have grounds to arrest 
him even though they had reason to believe he 
might be linked in some fashion to the killings. 
Further, whether or not the accused was a suspect, 
the absence of a caution is not determinative  of 
voluntariness. It is only a factor to consider. “The 
voluntariness inquiry is a contextual one that 
considers all the relevant circumstances and 
eschews rigid and strict rules,” said Justice Pardu. 
She continued:
In the present case, it was abundantly clear 
that, in his interactions with the police as of 
March 24, 2008, the [accused] freely chose to 
speak to police. At the April 15, 2008 
polygraph, he expl ic i t ly sa id to the 
interviewers, “No one’s going to intimidate me. 
You can’t intimidate me.” There is no suggestion 
that his will was overborne by the police.
At the start of the April 15 interview, police told 
the [accused] he was free to leave, that he 
could stop the polygraph process at any time, 
that he did not have to speak to police and that 
what he said could be admissible in court. He 
signed a consent form confirming that he did 
not have to say anything and that anything he 
said could be used in court. He had the benefit 
of legal advice before both the March 24 and 
April 15 interviews. [paras. 20-21]
“The arrest of the [accused] for impaired driving was lawful. The search was undertaken to 
look for marijuana and by a police officer who was not involved at all in the homicide 
investigations. Discovery of marijuana in the trunk of the [accused’s] car and in his knapsack 
would have some probative value on the issue of whether his ability to drive was impaired by 
marijuana. There was a reasonable basis for the officer’s actions and a reasonable prospect 
of finding evidence of the offence for which the [accused] had been arrested.”
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There was no basis to interfere with the conclusion 
that accused’s April 15 statements were voluntarily 
made beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE FOR 
DOMESTIC ASSAULT 
OVERRULED
R. v. E.G., 2017 MBCA 57                    
 
The accused had been involved in an 
off and on relationship with the 
victim for about three years but they 
had been only living with each other 
for two months. The accused 
discovered that the victim had stole money from 
him to buy drugs. He became furious with her. A 
struggle ensued. The accused choked the victim 
and placed his knees on her chest while they were 
on the floor. Then, he placed a leather belt around 
her neck to prevent her from fleeing.  He kept the 
belt around her neck for several hours and they 
went and tried to recover his money from the 
victim’s drug dealer.  The victim suffered physical 
and psychological injuries including  bruising to her 
head and body, abrasions to her throat, anxiety  and 
depression. The accused was charged with a 
number of offences.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused pled guilty to assault with a 
weapon and was found guilty after trial 
of an additional charge of assault. He 
was acquitted of other charges. He was 
sentenced to a conditional discharge with two 
years of supervised probation, concurrent on both 
counts. The judge found a conditional discharge 
was in the best interest of the accused and not 
contrary to the public interest. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
conditional discharge arguing 
the sentencing judge erred by 
not properly assessing the 
relevant sentencing principles and that he imposed 
an unfit sentence. Justice Lemaistre, speaking for 
the Court of Appeal, agreed. She found the 
sentencing judge did not give sufficient weight to 
general deterrence:
The circumstances of the offences are serious.  
The theft by the complainant of the accused’s 
money does not amount to provocation and 
does not excuse his violent reaction.  The initial 
assault was spontaneous, but the act of putting 
the belt around the complainant’s neck was 
deliberate, prolonged and demeaning.   One of 
the hallmarks of domestic violence is an 
attempt to control the behaviour of an intimate 
partner through the use of violence.  It is trite to 
say that cases involving domestic violence 
require a strong message of deterrence and 
denunciation.  In our view, the principle of 
general deterrence is not satisfied in this case 
by a discharge. [para. 8]
The Appeal Court also found there were no 
exceptional circumstances warranting a discharge. 
On re-sentencing, Justice Lemaistre noted the 
circumstances did not warrant re-incarceration. 
The accused pled guilty, lacked a record, had 
family support, ongoing employment and was a 
low risk to reoffend.  He had spent two days in 
custody  after his arrest, had been released on 
stringent judicial interim release  for three years and 
eight months and the offences occurred four years 
earlier. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, and a two-year 
suspended sentence with supervised probation was 
substituted.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“One of the hallmarks of domestic violence is an attempt to control the behaviour of an 
intimate partner through the use of violence.  It is trite to say that cases involving domestic 
violence require a strong message of deterrence and denunciation.”
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WARRANT HAS IMPLIED  
EXECUTION DATE
R. v. Saint, 2017 ONCA 491
Acting on confidential informer tips 
that the accused was trafficking 
drugs, the police obtained a warrant 
under s. 11 of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act to search his 
residence. The warrant identified the target of the 
investigation, the address to be searched, and the 
objects of the search. It authorized for “any peace 
officer, at any time, to enter the said place …” to 
conduct the search. However, it did not specify a 
date for its execution. The warrant was nevertheless 
served about seven hours after it was issued and the 
police seized methamphetamine, morphine, and 
hydromorphone. The accused was charged with 
drug offences.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued that the search 
breached s. 8 of the Charter because the 
warrant was invalid. He contended that 
the warrant was temporally unlimited. In 
his view, it authorized a search to be conducted on 
any date in the future at the sole discretion of the 
police, regardless of whether it took place days or 
even years later. He submitted that the search was 
therefore warrantless, breached s. 8 and the 
evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2).  
The judge concluded that the warrant was not 
“non-expiring”. Rather, he found it had an implied 
execution date. The judge upheld the  warrant as 
valid and found it was executed in a  reasonable 
manner. There were no s. 8 breaches and the 
evidence was admissible. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that a 
specified date for the search is 
just as critical to a warrant’s 
function and validity as is the 
location where  the search is to take place and what 
items are to be searched for. An undated warrant, 
he submitted, is “nn-expiry” and leaves the date of 
execution open to the discretion of the executing 
officers and conceivably to a date where there are 
no longer grounds for a search. 
Justice Miller, delivering the Appeal Court’s ruling, 
first described the reasons for a search warrant:
The function of a search warrant is to authorize 
police officers to enter a specified place they 
would otherwise have no authority to enter, in 
order to search for and seize specified property. 
Because forced entry into a private place, 
particularly a person’s residence, is such an 
extraordinary exercise of executive power, it is 
subject to stringent juridical control: it must be 
judicially authorized ex ante and is subject to 
judicial scrutiny ex post.
With respect to prior judicial authorization, the 
law is clear that a warrant must contain an 
adequate description of the place to be 
searched and the property to be searched for. 
There are multiple reasons for this demand for 
BY THE BOOK:
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
Information for search warrant
11 (1) A justice who, on ex parte application, is 
satisfied by information on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) a controlled substance or precursor in respect of which 
this Act has been contravened,
(b) any thing in which a controlled substance or precursor 
referred to in paragraph (a) is contained or concealed,
(c) offence-related property, or
(d) any thing that will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence under this Act or an offence, in whole or in 
part in relation to a contravention of this Act, under 
section 354 or 462.31 of the Criminal Code
is in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant authorizing a 
peace officer, at any time, to search the place for any such 
controlled substance, precursor, property or thing and to 
seize it.
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specificity. First, meaningful judicial pre-
authorization requires specific details. It is 
crucial for effective judicial control of the 
search that the reviewing justice understand the 
parameters of the proposed search, and that the 
search conducted be the search that was in fact 
authorized. Second, by providing a precise 
description of the place to be searched, the 
warrant directs the actions of the executing 
officers, guiding them to the specific place to 
be searched and defining the boundaries of the 
search. An insufficiently specific warrant will 
fail to provide the requisite guidance to the 
executing officers, leaving them to fill in the 
blanks with their own knowledge, or to pursue 
attractive leads at their own discretion. Third, 
specification of place in the warrant allows a 
person served with the warrant to readily 
apprehend that executing officers have legal 
authority to enter and conduct the search, 
reducing the risk of conflict and violent 
resistance to the search. [references omitted, 
paras. 6-7]
As for whether the warrant was “expressly non-
expiring” (as the accused had characterized it) and 
could be executed at any date in the future at the 
discretion of the police, the Court of Appeal 
rejected this notion. The language in the CDSA 
warrant authoring entry “at any time” did not mean 
the warrant could be executed at all times on any 
date in the future. Rather, it merely obviated the 
need for special justification for nighttime 
execution as is the  case for Criminal Code warrants 
as required by s. 488:
As the Crown argues, s. 11 of the CDSA is 
crucial context that informs the meaning of 
the phrase “at any time” in the warrant. 
Section 11 provides that “a justice who … is 
satisfied … that there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that …(a) a controlled substance … 
is in a place may, at any time, issue a warrant 
authorizing a peace officer, at any time, to 
search the place …” ... . Unlike warrants 
issued under sections 487 and 487.1 of the 
Criminal Code, which must be executed by 
day (as that term is defined in the Code), 
unless the preconditions for execution at night 
in s. 488 are met, a warrant issued under s. 11 
of the CDSA does not require any additional 
grounds to justify night-time execution, and 
no time of execution need be specified. 
[reference omitted, para. 16]
Nor was the warrant invalid for not specifying a 
date of execution. It had an implied execution date 
for entry. Since no other date appeared on the 
warrant, it was implicit that the warrant was sought 
to be executed on the day it was issued.  The failure 
to expressly set out a date on the warrant was a 
technical fault and did not necessarily invalidate it. 
The warrant was facially valid, there was no s. 8 
Charter breach and therefore no reason to consider 
the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“The function of a search warrant is to authorize police officers to enter a specified place 
they would otherwise have no authority to enter, in order to search for and seize specified 
property. Because forced entry into a private place, particularly a person’s residence, is such 
an extraordinary exercise of executive power, it is subject to stringent juridical control: it must 
be judicially authorized ex ante and is subject to judicial scrutiny ex post.”
“Unlike warrants issued under sections 487 
and 487.1 of the Criminal Code, which must 
be executed by day (as that term is defined 
in the Code), unless the preconditions for 
execution at night in s. 488 are met, a 
warrant issued under s. 11 of the CDSA 
does not require any additional grounds to 
justify night-time execution, and no time of 
execution need be specified”
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INVOLVING DECEASED’s 
MOTHER AT INTERROGATION 
NOT OPPRESSIVE
R. v. Calnen, 2017 NSCA 49
A 35-year-old woman was reported 
missing to the police. She had lived 
with the accused for two years before 
she went missing. He denied having 
involvement in her disappearance. 
Several weeks after she disappeared, he was 
arrested for her murder. He was taken to the police 
station where he was interviewed by a detective 
from 2:50 pm to 6:00 pm. He was given about an 
hour break during this time where  he exercised his 
right to counsel. He had met with and spoke to his 
lawyer for about 45 minutes. He was then 
transferred to another police station and 
interviewed again over a  period of 18 hours, from 
7:40 pm until 1:50 pm the following day, less a six 
hour break from 2:00 am to 8:00 am when he was 
taken to his cell. 
During his interview, the police played on the 
accused’s emotions. They made references to his 
children, played audio recordings from his son and 
the deceased’s mother, and read a letter from one 
of his daughters. The police also constantly  told the 
accused to “do the right thing.” At 11:40 am, the 
victim’s mother was brought into the interview 
room. She embraced him, held his hand, touched 
his arm and face, made references to their 
friendship and said she forgave him. She pleaded 
and begged with the accused to reveal where her 
daughter was buried so she could have closure. 
At 12:15 pm, the accused confessed to knowing the 
location of the victim’s ashes. The victim’s mother 
left the interview room and police continued to 
question the accused. Although he insisted he did 
not kill her, he admitted he moved and burned her 
body. Later, the accused carried out a 20 minute re-
enactment at his home explaining how the victim 
died. He was then taken back to his cell. The 
deceased’s body was never found but the accused 
was charged with second degree murder 
nevertheless and indecently interfering with human 
remains.  
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
11th National Symposium on Money 
Laundering and Financial Crimes         
June 28, 2017 
Online Replay 
Click here.
Meeting the Legal Challenges of Policing in 
Canada         
September 29, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
15th National Symposium on Search and 
Seizure Law in Canada   
November 17, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
11th National Symposium on Tech Crime 
and Electronic Evidence         
February 9, 2018 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
October 20, 2017 - Abbotsford, BC - Click here.
Volume 17 Issue 3 - May/June 2017
PAGE 16
Nova Scotia Supreme Court
The Crown submitted that all of the 
accused’s statements were voluntary. 
There were no threats, inducements or 
promises made, and he had an operating 
mind. The accused, on the other hand, argued that 
the police created an atmosphere  of oppression 
such that the statements he made were involuntary 
and therefore inadmissible. 
The judge did find that the deceased’s mother was a 
person in authority. She was acting as an agent of 
the state. She had been instructed by the police and 
had been assisted by them. Plus, the police were 
also present so there was no doubt the accused’s 
statements were made to a person in authority. 
The judge held that the deceased’s mother did not 
offer any  inducements. Her visit was not a  benefit 
or a reward. He also found the accused had an 
operating mind. There was no evidence the 
accused suffered from a mental illness or that he 
was on mind-altering medication. Nor was police 
trickery used. There was no evidence the police 
lied to him in any way. Finally, there was no 
oppressive atmosphere during the interrogation. 
Although the police strategy was clearly designed 
to play on the accused’s emotions, he was treated 
with respect. Appealing to the accused’s 
conscience  in the manner the police did was a 
prudent thing to do. “Bringing [the deceased’s 
mother] into the interview room was obviously  a 
late attempt to elicit a confession,” said the judge. 
“It worked and [the accused] subsequently told the 
police more details and walked them through a re-
enactment. When I consider all of the facts, the 
law, and apply a contextual analysis, I come to the 
overwhelming conclusion that the Crown has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statements were voluntary.” The accused was 
convicted of second degree murder and sentenced 
to life  imprisonment without parole for 15 years. 
He had also pled guilty to two counts of indecently 
interfering with human remains and was sentenced 
to five (5) years in prison on those charges.  
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction on a number of 
grounds including an assertion 
that the trial judge erred in 
applying the law about voluntariness to his 
statement and the re-enactment he made with 
police. In his view, bringing the victim’s mother 
into the interrogation room during questioning in 
order to persuade him to tell her where her 
daughter’s body was constituted an atmosphere  of 
oppression, thereby casting doubt on the 
voluntariness of his statements. 
Chief Justice MacDonald, in his minority opinion 
but agreed upon by the majority on this point, 
dismissed the voluntariness argument. He found the 
judge well understood the law and did not 
misapprehend the facts.  
The majority, however, set aside the second degree 
murder conviction on other grounds and ordered 
that any retrial, absent additional evidence, should 
be on a manslaughter charge only. 
Complete case available at www.courts.ns.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Calnen, 205 NSSC 291. 
Note-able Quote
“Our achievements today are but the sum total of 
our thoughts of yesterday” - Blaise Pascal
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INFORMER TIP & REASONABLE 
GROUNDS: LOOKING AT THE 
WHOLE PICTURE
R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 24
The police received information from 
a confidential informer. The tip 
described a person named “Adrian”. 
He was dealing powered and crack 
cocaine from his car and would 
deliver it to a  specific location within a few hours. 
The informer also provided a vehicle description 
and licence number. The police established 
surveillance at the address provided and, within a 
few minutes, the accused drove up to the 
residence. The car matched the description 
provided by the informer, including its license plate 
number, as did the accused’s physical description. 
Plus, the  accused arrived at the  residence within 
the time frame provided by the informer. The 
accused drove away after nine minutes and the 
police followed him, noting he picked up a 
passenger and conducted a “heat check.”
The accused was stopped and arrested by police for 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
They search his car and found 18.8 grams of 
cocaine and 18.8 grams of crack cocaine in his 
vehicle. He was charged with drug offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the police had the 
requisite reasonable grounds for the 
arrest. He considered the totality of the 
circumstances and was satisfied that the 
officer’s belief was subjectively  and objectively 
reasonable. There were no Charter breaches, and 
the accused was convicted of possessing cocaine 
and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the  police had insufficient 
grounds to effect his warrantless 
arrest and conduct the search 
that resulted in the discovery of the drugs. He 
submitted that a higher degree of corroboration was 
required because of the absence of information on 
the confidential informers source of knowledge. 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed. The totality of 
the circumstances supported the  trial judge’s 
findings and conclusion that reasonable grounds 
existed, and there  was no need for any additional 
corroboration:
        
First, was the information predicting the 
commission of the offence compelling? The 
[accused] does not take direct issue with this 
element of the test. The information predicting 
the commission of the offence was compelling. 
        BULLET POINTS
Reasonable Grounds
In R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated there 
were at least three factors to weigh in 
determining whether the police had 
reasonable and probable grounds on the 
basis of an informer’s tip: 
• Was the information compelling?
• Was the informer credible?
• Was the information corroborated?
Each of these factors does not form a 
separate test. Weaknesses in one area 
may be compensated by strengths in the 
other areas.
“[T]he driver’s behaviour was consistent 
with drug dealing. He was at the residence 
for a short time, then took an indirect route 
and picked up a passenger in front of a 
closed business.”
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The [accused] was in possession of a large 
amount of cocaine and crack cocaine. The 
confidential informant provided specifics on 
the anticipated commission of an offence 
including detailed information about the 
amount of drugs, based on the informant’s 
interaction with the [accused].
      
Second, was the confidential informant 
credible? The informant was very well known 
to the police and had a significant positive track 
record. He had provided reliable and 
consistently accurate information. He had 
never provided information that resulted in no 
drugs being seized or no warrant being issued. 
He had provided information to the police on 
ten prior occasions.
Third, was the information corroborated? The 
police corroborated the information provided 
by the confidential informant in that:
- the description of the driver matched that 
given by the confidential informant. He was 
black, in his mid-20s, and approximately 6 
feet tall with short black hair;
- the car was a Toyota Camry;
- its license number was BNEK 485;
- he drove to the precise residential address 
provided by the confidential informant; and
- he went there within the window of time 
described by the confidential informant.
Lastly, the driver’s behaviour was consistent 
with drug dealing. He was at the residence for 
a short time, then took an indirect route and 
picked up a passenger in front of a closed 
business.  [paras. 7-10]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
MISUSE OF CPIC A SERIOUS 
BREACH OF PUBLIC TRSUT
R. v. Heron, 2017 ONCA 441
The accused was a police officer and 
organizer of a  cheese smuggling 
racket. He asked his friend, another 
police officer, to bring some cheese 
into Canada from a New York 
pizzeria. His friend never declared the cheese at 
the border, nor did he or the accused ever pay the 
required duty. The cheese was sold to 
local Canadian restaurants for profit, 
at discount prices made possible 
by the evasion of the 246% 
duty.  About $133,000 of 
cheese and other food was 
smuggled and $325,000 in 
duty was evaded.
One day the friend, while on a return run in the 
United States, told the accused he thought he was 
being followed and it appeared that the scheme 
may have been discovered. He also told the 
accused that the police were making enquiries 
about them at the supplier. On his first shift back at 
work, the accused ran a CPIC check on his friend’s 
licence plate.  The CPIC check would not only 
provide information about the subject of the  search 
but also about who else has conducted a similar 
search within the previous 120 hours. As a result of 
this CPIC check the accused was charged with 
Criminal Code breach of trust. He was also charged 
with conspiracy and other Customs Act offences 
related to the smuggling operation.    
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found that the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the 
circumstances relating to the accused’s 
CPIC check was that he  made it in order 
to evade detection and try to determine to what 
extent his police colleagues were on to him. No 
other plausible alternative inferences were 
suggested by the accused. “I have no doubt that he 
made this query in hopes of evading detection,” 
said the judge. “The conspiracy was over.  [The 
accused’s friend] had stopped running cheese but it 
“First, was the information predicting the 
commission of the offence compelling? ... 
Second, was the confidential informant 
credible? ... Third, was the information 
corroborated?”
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was to [the accused’s] benefit to know what was 
going on with his colleagues, otherwise why would 
he have taken the risk?  He knew that these queries 
are tracked and a query of [his friend] is not so 
easily explained as a query of himself or his wife.”
The accused was convicted of breach of trust by  a 
public official, conspiracy to smuggle cheese into 
Canada from the United States without paying  the 
required duties and unlawful possession of 
imported goods under the Customs Act. He was 
sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for the 
smuggling offences and one month’s imprisonment, 
consecutive, on the breach of trust offence. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused sought to have 
his Criminal Code conviction 
for breach of trust set aside. In 
his view, the trial judge erred 
in concluding on the  totality of the circumstantial 
evidence that he conducted the CPIC check to try 
and find out whether the police were on to him. 
But the Court of Appeal disagreed. “The [accused] 
is a police officer. He is entitled to access the CPIC 
system, but only for matters relating to his duties as 
a police officer,” said Justice Blair. “If someone 
else ... had conducted a  similar enquiry recently it 
would suggest that the  police were investigating 
[the accused and his friend] and provide insight 
into what was going on at the time.” The Court of 
Appeal agreed that “the overwhelming, irresistible 
and only reasonable inference on the  record was 
that the [accused] conducted the CPIC query in 
order to gain insight into the status of the police 
investigation regarding  the cheese smuggling 
operations.”
Sentence Appeal
The accused also appealed his 
sentence, but this too was 
dismissed. “The [accused] is also 
a police officer holding a public 
office,” said Justice Blair, in 
part.  “The public  is entitled to 
expect honesty and not corruption in the members 
of its police  forces.  ... I also agree that the 
[accused’s] resort to CPIC with a view to protecting 
his criminal interests, as best he could, constituted 
a ser ious breach of publ ic t rust in the 
circumstances.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
TAX TROUBLES
The Canada Revenue Agency also went after the 
accused for not reporting income from his 
“business” of importing  cheese and other products 
and reselling them to restaurants in Canada. In 
2013, a Notice of Reassessment was issued against 
him for his unreported income of $23,916 and 
$84,216 in the 2010 and 2011 taxation years 
respectfully. Penalties were also levied (see  Heron 
v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2017 TCC 71).
“The [accused] is a police officer. He is entitled to access the CPIC system, but only for 
matters relating to his duties as a police officer.”
“The public is entitled to expect 
honesty and not corruption in the 
members of its police forces.”
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code: Breach of trust by public officer
s. 122 Every official who, in connection with the 
duties of his office, commits fraud or a breach 
of trust is guilty of an indictable offence and 
liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years, whether or not the fraud or breach of 
trust would be an offence if it were committed in relation to 
a private person.
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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Le 40e service commémoratif
annuel des policiers et agents
de la paix canadiens
Le 24 septembre 2017
Colline du Parlement
Ottawa (Ontario)
Canadian Police and
Peace Officers’ 40th Annual
Memorial Service
September 24, 2017
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
www.thememorial.ca
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2017 British Columbia 
Law Enforcement Memorial 
 
Sunday, September 24, 2017 at 1:00 pm 
Ceremony at the BC Legislature 
in Victoria, BC 
 
Law Enforcement participants to form up in the 700 block of Wharf Street at 12:00 pm. 
 
For complete events information, visit our website at http://www.bclem.ca 
or   
For details specific to your agency, contact your Ceremonial Sergeant Major 
 
 
 
 
Follow us on: 
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS ON THE RISE 3.0
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2017 to April 30, 2017. 
In April there were 136 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents a 97% increase over the 
number of deaths occurring  in April 2016. This 
amounts to about nine (9) people  dying every two 
days of the month (or 4.5 people per day).
From January 1 to April 30, 2017 there  were a  total 
of 488 illicit drug  overdose deaths. This is a 68% 
increase over the same period last year.
Last year, there were 931 overdose deaths, more 
than an 81% increase over the same period in 
2015 and a 246%  over 2012. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. In December 2016 alone, there 
were 142 deaths. This was the highest recorded 
number of deaths occurring in a single month in 
BC and was more than double the  monthly average 
of illicit drug overdose deaths since 2015. 
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People aged 30-39 have been the hardest hit so far 
in 2017 with 144 illicit drug overdose deaths 
followed by  40-49 year-olds at 105 deaths and 
50-59 year-olds at 100 deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 144 followed by Surrey (51), Victoria 
(37), Kelowna (32) and Abbotsford (21). 
Males continue to die at almost a 5:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January  to April 2017, 
404 males have died while there  were 84 female 
deaths.
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The data  indicates that most illicit drug overdose 
deaths (89.5%) occurred inside while 9.6% 
occurred outside. For four (4) deaths, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 13 months preceding the 
declaration (March 2015-March 2016) 
totaled 667. The number of deaths 
in the 13 months following the 
declaration (April 2016-April 
2017) totaled 1,202. This is 
an increase of 80%.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug 
overdose deaths from 2015 and 2016 were 
cocaine, which was detected in 48.4% of deaths, 
f e n t a ny l ( 4 4 . 8 % ) , h e r o i n ( 3 6 . 2 % ) a n d 
methamphetamine/amphetamine (29.3%). 
From January to February 2017, fentanyl was 
detected in 61% (139) of illicit drug overdose 
deaths. This is a 90% increase in which fentanyl 
was detected in deaths occurring during the same 
period in 2016 where fentanyl was detected in 79 
deaths.
According to Vancouver Coastal Health, drugs 
users at Insite  - a supervised injection site - checked 
their drugs more than 1,000 times from July 2016 
to March 2017. Overall, 79% of the drugs checked 
were positive for fentanyl, including 83% of heroin 
samples, 82% of crystal meth and 40% of cocaine.
44727
146 264
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Many police departments are trying to message to various segments 
of the population in different ways. Above is one such messaging 
example provided by the Abbotsford Police Department as is the 
example on p. 23 (Source Abbotsford Police). 
Sources: 
-Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2017 to April 30, 
2017.  
-Fentanyl Detected Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths - January 1, 2012 to 
February 28, 2017. 
Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. April 19, 2017. 
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OPIOID-RELATED DEATHS CAN BE PREVENTED
LEARN MORE AT CANADA.CA/OPIOIDS 
apparent opioid-related deaths2,458
* Based on available preliminary data as of May 26, 2017. Data from Quebec are not available at this time. 
 This figure may change as more updated data become available.
 While the uniform definition of apparent opioid-related death is being implemented, 
 provincial/territorial differences in reporting remain.
death rate of 8.8 per 100,000 population
APPARENT OPIOID-RELATED
DEATHS in CANADA
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CROWN BEARS BURDEN OF 
PROVING WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH REASONABLE
R. v. Dunstan, 2017 ONCA 432
Police were engaged in a drug 
trafficking investigation known as 
“Project Gladiator”, led by a Staff 
Sergeant. They had obtained wiretap 
authorizations and a general warrant 
to enter places associated with the principal target 
of the investigation and other known persons and 
to search for items related to the investigation such 
as drugs and other evidence. The general warrant 
allowed police to disguise  these covert entries - or 
sneak and peeks - as break-ins if they located a 
large cache of drugs. But they were unable to 
locate the  stash house. The accused was not a 
major target of the  project but he had been seen by 
police associating with the target. The police 
located the accused’s vehicle parked at a  residence. 
However, his residence was not named in the 
general warrant.  
Early one morning the police received an 
anonymous call on their non-emergency  line from 
a blocked number reporting a break-in at the 
accused’s residence. The caller said he had seen 
eight men run out from the house and it looked 
suspicious. The caller could not be identified nor 
could the call be traced. Responding officers found 
the front door broken open. They entered the house 
to ensure the safety of anyone inside. No one was 
there  but the police discovered various open bags 
of drugs in plain view. They secured the premises, 
obtained a search warrant and subsequently found 
43 lbs of marijuana, 4.7 kgs of cocaine, 4 kgs of 
psilocybin, 6.77 g of MDMA and over $100,000 in 
cash.  The officers seized the drugs, the cash and 
some drug-related paraphernalia. The accused was 
charged.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
In a pre-trial Charter  motion, the accused 
sought to have the evidence of the  drugs 
and cash excluded on the basis that the 
police had staged the break-in and 
placed the anonymous call in order to gain access 
to his house illegally. This he argued, breached his 
s. 8 Charter right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. He alleged that the Staff Sergeant 
was the anonymous caller and instigator of the 
break-in. The Staff Sergeant vigorously denied this. 
As a consequence, the accused wanted an expert to 
compare the the Staff Sergeant’s voice to the  voice 
on the recorded call using spectrographic voice 
identification analysis.  To do this, the accused 
The Anonymous Call to Police
Operator: York Regional Police Communications,  Jaime 
Caller: Uh, I just saw eight guys run out of a house 
at 76 Red Ash and look suspicious.
Operator: 76 Red Ash?
Caller: Yup.
Operator: What city is that in?
Caller: It’s in Markham.
Operator: And this just happened?
Caller: It just happened, like 15 minutes ago.
Operator: So where are they now?
Caller: I’m not following them. I don’t know.  They 
didn’t look too friendly.
Operator: So eight males 15 minutes ago ran out of 
…
Caller: [Hangs up.]
Operator: Hello?
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requested an order from the  judge permitting the 
use a  high-quality microphone to record the 
testimony of the Staff Sergeant for the expert 
analysis rather than relying on the lower-quality 
court recording. 
Although he permitted the Staff Sergeant to read the 
text of the anonymous call into the record four 
times, the judge rejected the request to use a high-
quality microphone. He concluded he did not have 
the power to make such an order. First, he said he 
could not compel a witness to provide a voice 
sample. Second, he ruled he did not have the 
inherent power to make the order. Finally, he 
rejected the accused’s argument that the right to 
make full answer and defence permitted the 
recording. As a result, the expert was unable to 
provide a  professional opinion about the 
comparison because  only a low-quality  recording 
was used. 
Next, the judge determined that the accused bore 
the burden of establishing, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the original break-in was 
committed by police. Although suspicious, the 
judge was not satisfied the  Staff Sergeant was 
responsible  for the break-in and made the 
anonymous call. The judge went on to conclude 
that there were no Charter breaches related to any 
of the three entries: (1) the initial break and enter, 
(2) the entry by the police in response to the 
anonymous telephone call and (3) the subsequent 
search by the police and seizure of the drugs under 
the search warrant. The  evidence was admissible 
and the accused was convicted of multiple counts 
of possessing drugs for the purpose of trafficking 
and one count of possessing proceeds of crime. He 
was sentenced to eight years’ in prison, less credit 
of 18 months for pre-sentence custody and strict 
bail conditions. A forfeiture order, DNA order and a 
weapons prohibition were also imposed. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued the trial 
judge erred in determining 
there  was no the authority to 
allow the defence to record the 
Staff Sergeant’s voice using a high-quality 
microphone so it could be properly analyzed on a 
spectrograph. He also suggested that the judge 
erred in holding that he  bore the burden of proving 
the illegality of the warrantless entry into his home. 
Ordering the Recording
Justice Blair, writing the 
unanimous judgment for the 
Court of Appeal, concluded 
that the applications judge 
did have the power to order 
the recording. The Staff 
Sergeant was not being 
compelled solely  for the 
purpose of having his voice recorded. He was 
properly before the court giving substantive 
evidence on the voir dire  and his voice was being 
recorded anyways. Using a high-qual i ty 
microphone was merely  substi tuting one 
technology for another in relation to how the Staff 
Sergeant’s voice would be recorded. This would not 
further intrude into his privacy or security rights. 
Further, the judge did have the discretionary 
authority  to order the use of a high-quality 
microphone, either under Ontario’s Courts Justice 
Act or his inherent jurisdiction as a Superior Court 
judge, to ensure the fairness of a trial and the 
accused’s right to make full answer and defence. 
Justice Blair said, among other things:
The rights of an accused should not turn on the 
particular level of technology utilized by the 
court, in my view. If it is permissible for an 
“The rights of an accused should not turn on the particular level of technology utilized by the 
court, in my view. If it is permissible for an expert to listen to the court recording of a witness’s 
testimony for purposes of subjecting it to a voice identification comparison with another 
voice on another recording ... it should not become impermissible to do so simply because of 
a difference in the quality of the recording device used to record that testimony.” 
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expert to listen to the court recording of a 
witness’s testimony for purposes of subjecting it 
to a voice identification comparison with 
another voice on another recording – as the 
Crown acknowledges – it should not become 
impermissible to do so simply because of a 
difference in the quality of the recording device 
used to record that testimony.  To the extent the 
giving of testimony in these circumstances may 
amount to the provision of a bodily sample for 
the purposes of forensic testing – as the Crown 
puts it – the sample is being provided in any 
event. [para. 63]
  
Burden of Proof
The Court of Appeal found the applications judge 
erroneously required that the accused needed to 
establish that the warrantless search was not 
justified. “Even though there is a general burden on 
an accused to persuade the court that his or her 
Charter rights have been infringed, once it is 
established that a  search was a  warrantless search – 
as the entry  of the York Regional Police was, 
admittedly, here – the jurisprudence provides that 
the onus shifts to the  Crown to justify the entry,” 
said Justice Blair.  He continued:
The initial entry involving the break-in and the 
York Regional Police entry are inextricably 
intertwined in the circumstances.  The 
warrantless entry could not be justified 
(whatever the reasonable belief of the YRP 
officers and the circumstances confronting 
them on their arrival) if it had been triggered by 
an unlawful ruse carried out by state actors in 
the first place.  The Crown does not dispute 
this.  To hold otherwise – as the [accused] 
points out – would be to permit the police to 
Charter-proof their conduct from constitutional 
scrutiny by the simple expedient of having one 
officer trick another into making a warrantless 
entry, on the theory that the blamelessness of 
the “dupe” officer would insulate the conduct 
from attack.  For this reason, in my opinion, the 
two entries – the allegedly fake break-in and 
subsequent anonymous phone call, and the 
responding entry by the York Regional Police – 
are part of a single integrated chain of events 
that should not be considered, in silo fashion, 
as two independent and separate events.
Considering the two entries as a whole, the 
overall burden of persuasion rests with the 
Crown to justify the entry and the police 
conduct associated with it.  That said, there is 
an evidentiary burden to be met by the 
[accused] in the circumstances. The evidentiary 
burden required the [accused] to lead evidence 
demonstrating a credible “air of reality” to the 
allegation that a state agent, [the Staff 
Sergeant], made the anonymous call and that 
he or his team was responsible for the initial 
break-in.   ... [The accused] succeeded in doing 
just that.   The onus must then shift back to the 
Crown to counter the credible evidence led by 
the accused and to meet its ultimate persuasive 
burden of satisfying the court, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the police entry was justified.
But the Crown led no such counter-evidence, 
although it was within the Crown’s own 
particular knowledge and power to do so, if 
such evidence existed.   It was content to stand 
by [the Staff Sergeant’s] strong denial that he 
was the anonymous caller or that he or his 
team had staged the break-in. 
Indeed, in the face of the preliminary 
foundation laid by the [accused], the Crown 
remained passive.   Although requested by the 
[accused] to do so, it did not provide [the Staff 
Sergeant’s] cell phone records, which the pre-
trial application judge observed “would have 
been very helpful evidence”.   The [accused] 
argued that, since [the Staff Sergeant] 
acknowledged he did not have a personal cell 
phone and only used his Durham Regional 
Police cell phone, his phone records would 
have shown whether he did or did not make 
the anonymous call to the non-emergency line 
on the morning in question.  Although 
“Even though there is a general burden on 
an accused to persuade the court that his 
or her Charter rights have been infringed, 
once it is established that a search was a 
warrantless search .. the jurisprudence 
provides that the onus shifts to the Crown 
to justify the entry.”
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requested by the [accused] to do so, the Crown 
also did not provide information respecting [the 
Staff Sergeant’s] whereabouts which, the 
[accused] argued, may have shown whether he 
was or was not near 76 Red Ash Drive on the 
morning in question. [paras. 86-89]
Had the applications judge properly applied the 
Crown onus, “he may or may not have decided that 
the evidence fell short of satisfying him on a 
balance of probabilities that the Crown had 
justified the warrantless entry”. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and a new trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Dunstan, 2016 ONSC 971. 
POLICE NEED NOT 
CORROBORATE ALL OF 
INFORMER’s INFORMATION
R. v. Reid, 2017 ONCA 430
 
A confidential informer told the 
police that they had purchased 
cocaine from the accused, who he 
knew as “Rocky”, and his roommate, 
a man named Cal Morris. The 
informer also said the accused possessed a gun. The 
police conducted surveillance at the address 
provided by the informer and observed the accused 
at the  address. Based on the informer’s information 
and the  surveillance  evidence, at 8:32 pm the 
police applied for a  telewarrant under s. 487.1 of 
the Criminal Code to search the accused’s 
residence for a  handgun, identification and cocaine 
in relation to an offence under s. 91(1) of the 
Criminal Code. The affiant justified the application 
for a telewarrant by stating 
that it was after 4:00 pm, 
the court house was closed 
and a justice of the  peace 
was not available in the 
jurisdiction. The warrant 
allowed for its execution 
over a three day period.
The next day the accused was observed engaging in 
several hand-to-hand transactions suggestive of 
drug trafficking. He was arrested and found in 
possession of drugs. The search warrant was then 
executed and police discovered cocaine, cash and 
drug trafficking paraphernalia  in the accused’s 
apartment but no gun was found. In total, the 
police seized 123.34 grams of powder cocaine  and 
151.98 grams of crack cocaine.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused brought an application 
under s. 8 of the Charter arguing, in 
part, that there were insufficient grounds 
upon which to justify the search 
warrant, including  the conditions for using the 
telewarrant procedure. Since the warrant was 
invalid, the  police breached his right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure and the 
evidence collected ought to have been excluded. 
The judge concluded that the conditions for a 
telewarrant had been satisfied. He also held that 
the informer’s information had been sufficiently 
corroborated. The warrant was valid and the 
evidence was admissible. The accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime. He 
was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, less 
nine months’ credit as he was subject to restrictive 
bail conditions.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused alleged the trial 
judge made several mistakes. 
He submitted, among other 
things, that the judge erred in 
finding reasonable and probable grounds with 
respect to the firearm offence. He also again 
suggested the conditions for obtaining a telewarrant 
were not met and the informer information was not 
sufficiently corroborated.
Firearms Offence 
The accused contended that the  ITO did not 
provide reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe an offence had been committed under 
TELEWARRANT
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s. 91(1) of the  Criminal Code because it did not 
provide any evidence that his possession of the 
handgun was illegal. There was no information in 
the ITO about whether the police took any 
investigative steps to determine whether he had a 
valid firearm licence or certificate, or whether he 
was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Rather, 
the ITO affiant merely deposed that he believed the 
accused was in possession of a handgun based on 
the informer’s information that he had seen the gun 
in the accused’s possession.
Justice van Rensburg, writing the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, disagreed. He found the trial judge did 
not err in concluding that the ITO disclosed 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe the 
accused was unlawfully in possession of a firearm. 
“The [accused’s] illegal possession of the handgun 
could be inferred reasonably, if not inevitably, from 
the circumstances set out in the ITO,” he said. “The 
[accused] had a criminal record, which included 
offences that attracted a mandatory weapons 
prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code. 
Further, it was reasonable  to assume that the 
possession of a gun by the [accused] in the context 
of his activities as a drug dealer would be illegal.”
The Telewarrant
The accused asserted that the conditions for a 
telewarrant had not been met. Since the  affiant 
requested three days to execute the search warrant, 
the accused suggested that it was not impracticable 
for the affiant to appear personally before a justice.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge did 
not err in finding the conditions for a telewarant 
had been met. “Section 487.1 of the Code provides 
for the issuance of a telewarrant, and requires the 
applicant’s ‘belief that an indictable offence has 
been committed and that it would be impracticable 
to appear personally before a justice to make 
application for a warrant’,” said Justice van 
Rensburg.  He cited R. v. Clark, 2015 BCCA 488, a 
decision affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
where  the British Columbia Court of Appeal stated 
that “the impracticability requirement is concerned 
with whether it is practicable to make an in-person 
application at the time the application is brought; it 
does not require that an immediate need for a 
warrant be demonstrated.” Justice van Rensburg 
continued:
Similarly, in this case, the affiant explained that 
the court house was closed when the 
application was made. Further, the trial judge 
reasonably concluded that waiting 12 hours to 
obtain a search warrant could have impacted 
the ability to execute the warrant. As in Clark, 
the onus is on the [accused] to demonstrate 
that it was practicable for the affiant to have 
made an in-person application notwithstanding 
the fact that the court house was closed. The 
trial judge did not err in her conclusion that the 
“impracticability” requirement for a telewarrant 
had been met. [para. 23]
Corroboration
The accused maintained that the police did not 
sufficiently corroborate the information provided by 
the informer because they did not corroborate the 
information provided about his roommate Morris 
and failed to explain how they identified the 
accused during their surveillance. This argument 
too was rejected.
The trial judge was required to consider whether 
the information from the confidential informer was 
compelling, credible  and corroborated. “The trial 
judge noted that where the police receive 
“The [accused’s] illegal possession of the handgun could be inferred reasonably, if not 
inevitably, from the circumstances set out in the ITO. The [accused] had a criminal record, 
which included offences that attracted a mandatory weapons prohibition under s. 109 of the 
Criminal Code. Further, it was reasonable to assume that the possession of a gun by the 
[accused] in the context of his activities as a drug dealer would be illegal.”
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compelling  information from a known CI with a 
track record of reliability, ‘something less in the 
way of verification might suffice’,” noted the Court 
of Appeal. “The law does not require the police to 
corroborate every detail of a CI’s tip. Rather, the 
totality of the circumstances must meet the 
standard of reasonableness and weaknesses in one 
area may, to some extent, be compensated by 
strengths in the other two.” In this case, Justice van 
Rensburg stated:
[T]here were reasonable grounds to justify the 
issuance of the search warrant sought based on 
the information in the ITO, taken as a whole. 
The CI provided detailed and firsthand 
information about the [accused]. In particular, 
he or she described the handgun, when they 
last saw it and how many times they had seen 
it. The CI also provided very specific 
information regarding how often and how 
much cocaine he or she personally purchased 
from “Rocky” who lived at the [accused’s] 
address. As the trial judge correctly noted, the 
information provided by the CI was not 
commonplace or easily ascertainable. 
Furthermore, it was reasonably open to the 
issuing justice to find that the CI was credible, 
after considering the CI’s track record of 
reliability and his or her motive for providing 
the information to the police. In these 
circumstances, the past reliability of the CI and 
the specific nature of the CI’s information made 
up for the fact that not every aspect of the tip 
was corroborated. [para. 29]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
ARRESTEE NOT ALWAYS 
LIMITED TO ‘ONE PHONE CALL’
R. v. Stevens, 2016 QCCA 1707
 
The accused was arrested at his 
residence on charges of rape and 
indecent assault for offences 
occurring some 30 years earlier. He 
was taken to a police station to be 
interrogated. After the accused was read his 
constitutional rights at 9:13 am, he was led to 
another room so that he could exercise  his right to 
counsel. He managed to reach a civil lawyer by 
telephone, but the lawyer was unable to help him. 
The civil lawyer provided the name of a criminal 
defence lawyer and the accused wrote the criminal 
lawyer’s name on a piece of paper. When he 
returned to the interrogation room at 9:28 am, he 
brought the paper with him.
The officer saw the lawyer's name on 
the piece of paper and recognized it as 
the name of a local criminal lawyer he 
had previously encountered. When the 
officer saw the name, he  inferred that 
the accused had written it down during 
his conversation with the civil lawyer. In 
addition, the accused told the officer 
that his civil lawyer had recommended 
the other lawyer and that is why he 
jotted down the telephone number. The 
accused also told the police officer that 
he thought he could not contact the criminal 
lawyer right away because the officer had earlier 
told him he had no right to another phone call. 
During the interrogation, which lasted about five 
hours, the criminal lawyer left messages for the 
accused at the police  station, but these were not 
delivered to him until the end of the interrogation. 
At the end of the day, the accused was able to 
speak with his criminal lawyer. 
“[T]he law does not require the police to 
corroborate every detail of a CI’s tip. 
Rather, the totality of the circumstances 
must meet the standard of reasonableness 
and weaknesses in one area may, to some 
extent, be compensated by strengths in the 
other two.”
“Section 10(b) gives the detainee the right 
to the assistance of counsel, not, like in 
the movies, a constitutional right limited 
to ... ‘one phone call’.”
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Court of Quebec
Although the accused never admitted to 
the offences, the Crown nonetheless 
sought to introduce the  video recorded 
interrogation as evidence. The accused 
requested a voir dire  and challenged its 
admissibility. He argued, among other things, that 
his right to counsel under s. 10 (b) of the Charter 
had been breached during the interrogation and 
that the statement should be excluded under s. 
24(2). 
Although the officer told the accused that his right 
to counsel had been exercised in calling  the civil 
lawyer (even when he saw the  criminal defence 
lawyer’s name on the piece of paper), the judge 
found that the  accused’s right to counsel had not 
been breached. The judge held that the officer had 
given the accused another opportunity to contact 
the criminal defence lawyer but the accused 
declined. The officer was required to do nothing 
more.  “The accused was informed of his right to 
counsel of his choice,” said the judge. “The 
accused had a reasonable opportunity to exercise 
this right and... even reached a [lawyer]”. The 
interrogation recording was admissible as evidence 
and the accused was convicted of rape and 
indecent assault.
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused raised several 
grounds of appeal including 
the argument that the trial 
judge erred in law by finding 
that there was no violation of his right to counsel 
under s. 10(b). In his view, the officer did not 
provide him with a reasonable opportunity to 
exercise his right to counsel. The Crown, on the 
other hand, submitted that the trial judge did not 
err. In the Crown’s view, s. 10(b) of the Charter  does 
not require that the  police officer review the quality 
of the counsel received by the detainee once 
attorney-client communication is established. 
Right to Counsel
Justice Kasirer, on behalf of the Court of Appeal, 
concluded the accused’s right to counsel had been 
breached. Unlike what the trial judge found, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that the officer did not 
inform the accused that the criminal defence 
lawyer was trying  to contact him during the 
interrogation, even though he knew the accused 
wanted to speak with this lawyer. Nowhere in the 
video did the officer tell the accused he could 
contact the criminal lawyer and the judge was 
mistaken in finding so.
As for what the s. 10(b) right to counsel entails, the 
Court of Appeal stated: 
... [I]t is understood that, beyond the duty to 
inform detainees of their rights, s. 10(b) 
imposes at least two duties on police officers. 
First, if a detainee indicates that he or she 
wishes to exercise this right, the police officer 
must, barring emergency, provide the detainee 
with a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
Second, the police officer must refrain from 
eliciting evidence until the detainee has had 
that reasonable opportunity.
The duty imposed on officers to give detainees 
the reasonable opportunity to exercise their 
right to counsel, which is distinct from the duty 
to inform, flows from the very wording of s. 
10(b) of the Charter, as doctrinal authors 
remind us. We may go even further and say that 
a joint reading of the French and English 
versions provides a dual perspective on the 
“application” aspect of the right to counsel. The 
expression “to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay” in the English text emphasizes 
the act of communication undertaken by the 
“[I]t is understood that, beyond the duty to inform detainees of their rights, s. 10(b) imposes 
at least two duties on police officers. First, if a detainee indicates that he or she wishes to 
exercise this right, the police officer must, barring emergency, provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to do so. Second, the police officer must refrain from eliciting 
evidence until the detainee has had that reasonable opportunity.”
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detainee with the lawyer; with the words 
“d’avoir recours sans délai à l’assistance de 
l’avocat”, the French text, for its part, focuses 
on the opposite perspective, the actual 
provision of legal advice by a lawyer to a 
detainee, who is here seen as the recipient of 
the advice.
The versions are not inconsistent; together, they 
contribute to the expression of a common 
meaning encompassing the full scope of the 
Charter-enshrined right. The right to counsel 
includes the right to inform the counsel 
retained of the situation in which the detainee 
finds himself or herself (”the right to retain and 
instruct counsel”), and its corollary, the right to 
obtain advice from the attorney retained (“le 
droit...à l’assistance de l’avocat”). Implicit in 
the term “assistance” is the notion of instructing 
counsel in an attorney-client relationship, 
which is explicit in the term “instruct” in the 
English version. Similarly, “to instruct counsel” 
also implies receiving “assistance” from a 
lawyer, which is explicit in the French text. The 
two versions combine to express the bilateral 
relationship of attorney-client communication 
at the heart of this Charter-enshrined right.
Moreover, the recognition of this two-way 
relationship is necessary to fulfill the objective 
of s. 10(b). As the Supreme Court noted in R. v. 
Willier,[12] “s. 10(b)’s text  remains the starting 
point in its interpretation, an understanding of 
its animating purposes is essential to a full 
understanding of its content”. The purposive 
interpretation proposed by the Supreme Court 
takes into account the objective of the right to 
counsel, which seeks to mitigate the power 
imbalance between the detainee and the State 
when the former is being interrogated by police 
officers.This interpretation –focused on the right 
to counsel as a bulwark against the abusive 
deprivation of freedom and a buttress for the 
right to silence – is consistent with the 
relationship of bilateral communication 
protected by the two versions of s. 10(b). 
[references omitted, 61-64]
The police breached the accused’s right to counsel 
in this case by failing to give him a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right to counsel without 
delay. Although he did speak to a lawyer, the officer 
should have  inferred that the accused had not been 
able to benefit from the assistance of the lawyer 
when the officer observed the accused had written 
the name of a  criminal lawyer on a piece of paper. 
Rather than redressing the situation, the officer 
misled the accused by allowing him to believe that 
his constitutional right had been exhausted with the 
“one phone call” to which he was entitled and by 
keeping quiet about the messages from the lawyer 
with whom the accused wanted to speak. The 
officer knowingly prevented the accused from 
exercising his constitutional right.
“When police officers have clear indications that 
attorney-client communication has not been 
sufficiently established, they may not refuse to 
fulfill their duty under the pretext that the accused 
is entitled to only ‘one phone call’,” said Justice 
Kasirer. “Giving the [accused] ‘one phone call’ was 
clearly not sufficient to fulfill the police officer’s 
duty in relation to “implementing” the right 
enshrined at s. 10(b)”. He continued:
...[I]t is true that “normally, s. 10(b) affords the 
detainee a single consultation with a lawyer.” 
However, if the circumstances demonstrate 
that, despite the call, the right to counsel has 
not been exercised because the detainee was 
“When police officers have clear indications 
that attorney-client communication has not 
been sufficiently established, they may not 
refuse to fulfill their duty under the pretext 
that the accused is entitled to only ‘one 
phone call’.”
“[I]t is true that ‘normally, s. 10(b) affords the detainee a single consultation with a lawyer.’ 
However, if the circumstances demonstrate that, despite the call, the right to counsel has not 
been exercised because the detainee was not able to ‘instruct counsel’ and did not receive 
the ‘assistance’ of a lawyer, the ... ‘one phone call’ does not suffice.”
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not able to “instruct counsel” and did not 
receive the “assistance” of a lawyer, the ... “one 
phone call” does not suffice. What constitutes a 
“reasonable opportunity” to exercise the right 
to counsel necessarily varies according to the 
facts of each case. Section 10(b) gives the 
detainee the right to the assistance of counsel, 
not, like in the movies, a constitutional right 
limited to ... “one phone call”. [references 
omitted, para. 75]
Here, the officer had clear indication that the  legal 
counsel obtained by the accused during his phone 
call with the civil lawyer was not adequate. The 
officer  knowingly ignored this so that he could 
continue the interrogation without interruption. 
“The officer understood, when he saw [the criminal 
defence lawyer's] name on the piece of paper, or at 
the latest when he received the telephone message 
for the [accused], that the [accused] had not had a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise his right to 
counsel,” said Justice Kasirer. “He continued 
questioning him, violating his duty with respect to 
the implementation of the right provided at s. 10(b) 
of the Charter.”
Exclusion of Evidence 
In excluding the video recorded interrogation as 
evidence, the  Court of Appeal found the police 
misconduct to be serious:
[N]ot only did the police officer act without 
regard for the [accused’s] right to counsel, he 
also took deliberate action to undermine the 
exercise of that right by purposefully 
concealing [the criminal lawyer’s] messages 
and allowing the [accused] to believe that he 
had to wait until the end of the interrogation 
before being able to obtain his assistance. The 
police officer was seeking to limit the 
[accused’s] right to silence to further his 
inves t iga t ion, wi thout regard for h is 
constitutional rights: this blameworthy conduct 
on the part of a police officer is an abuse of 
authority which falls near the most serious end 
of the scale referred to by the Supreme Court in 
Grant [para. 93]
A new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
WHEN IS A ‘GUN’ A FIREARM?
That is a  question the Ontario Court of Appeal had 
to answer in R. v. Gordon, 2017 ONCA 436. The 
accused was charged with conspiracy, armed 
robbery, two counts of forcible confinement and 
using a firearm while committing an indictable 
offence. One of the victims of a robbery said one of 
the robbers pointed a  handgun and threatened to 
shoot. The gun was not fired during the robbery and 
was never recovered. 
Despite the accused arguing that the evidence was 
equally consistent with the gun being an imitation 
firearm, the trial judge concluded that the gun was 
real, capable  of firing bullets and fell within the 
definition of a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal 
Code. The accused then tried to argue before 
Ontario’s top court that this finding was 
unreasonable. But the Court of Appeal disagreed:
There was ample evidence from which the trial 
judge could infer that the gun used in the 
robbery was a real gun capable of firing bullets.  
Certainly, the victims thought it was real and 
the robbers acted as if it was real. A trier of fact 
is entitled, although clearly not obligated, to 
take a robber at his word when, in the course 
of the robbery and to subdue the victims, the 
robber points what appears to be a gun at the 
victim and threatens to shoot them.  It is a fair 
inference that the threat is not an idle one and 
that the robber has the means at hand to make 
good on the threat. [para. 31] 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
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INFORMATION PROVIDED 
BY CREDIBLE SOURCE & 
CONFIRMED: RGB UPHELD
R. v. Gow-Leach, 2017 QCCA 764
A confidential informer known to the 
police claimed that the accused, 
aged 20 to 25 years, was a drug 
courier for a person named Brett 
Tylor. Police believed on reasonable 
grounds that Tylor was a  drug supplier and used a 
grey Honda Accord with licence plate number: 501 
ZBX. The confidential informer provided the  area in 
which the accused lived and said he stored his 
drugs there. Another source – an anonymous 
citizen who did not wish to be named – confirmed 
that the accused sold drugs and owned a grey 
Honda Accord. The anonymous citizen also 
provided the exact apartment address of the 
accused. 
 
Police surveillance and data  files confirmed the 
following:
• The accused was 22 years old; 
• He owned a grey Honda Accord registered to 
501 ZBX; 
• He paid the electricity bill at the address 
provided by the anonymous source;
• Brett Tylor went three times in five surveillance 
days to the accused’s apartment building; and 
• The accused’s vehicle was seen at least once 
in the apartment building’s rear parking lot.
The police obtained a search warrant and executed 
it at the accused’s apartment. They found 2.8 grams 
of cocaine and 309 grams of marihuana. He was 
charged with drug related offences. 
Court of Quebec
The accused argued that the police 
breached his s. 8 Charter right and the 
evidence ought to have been excluded 
under s. 24(2). However, the  trial judge 
concluded that the Information to Obtain (ITO), 
even after excising any erroneous information, 
nonetheless afforded reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the accused had committed 
an offence under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA) and that evidence of that 
crime would be found at his apartment. The 
evidence was admitted and the accused was found 
guilty of two drug related offences. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused maintained, in 
part, that the trial judge 
wrongly concluded that the 
ITO for the search warrant 
could have afforded reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that he had committed an 
offence under the CDSA and that evidence of that 
crime would be found at his apartment.
In reviewing a search warrant, the court does not 
determine whether it would itself have issued the 
warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible 
and reliable evidence for the authorizing judge to 
do so. Further, an accused bears the burden of 
demonstrating that an ITO is insufficient. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
trial judge that sufficient reliable information 
remained to issue the warrant. “The information 
was reliable,” said Appeal Court. “[The confidential 
informer] had already supplied the police with 
reliable  information in the past. The anonymous 
citizen was also reliable since part of the 
information he provided were corroborated by [the 
confidential informer] and the police investigation 
carried out prior to the issuance of the search 
warrant.”
The search of the accused’s apartment was not 
unreasonable and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Happiness is not the end of life; character is.” - 
Henry Ward Beecher
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REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR 
BELIEF LESS THAN BALANCE OF 
PROBABILITIES
R. v. Henareh, 2017 BCCA 7
An unknown tipster told a police 
sergeant that a man named “Aghasi”, 
who was associated with a particular 
address, and a man named “Henareh” 
were involved in importing opium into 
Canada. This information was relayed to the 
Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA). A week 
later, the sergeant received more information from 
the same tipster that “Aghasi” and “Henareh” were 
importing  opium from Iran, that Aghasi had been 
responsible for importing large amounts of opium 
into Canada, and that there  was a large amount of 
opium in Aghasi’s residence. The sergeant attended 
the address provided by the tipster and spoke with 
a man named Aghasi Salamant Ravandi. He 
confirmed that Ravandi was from Iran and, while 
his father was an opium addict, he had never 
before seen opium. He invited the sergeant to do a 
cursory search of the apartment but no opium was 
discovered.
About a month later, the sergeant received 
information from the CBSA that a shipment had 
arrived from Iran addressed to Ravandi at his 
residence. The shipment consisted of four large 
packages said to contain teapots and rugs. The 
packages were referred for secondary inspection 
and found to contain about 18 kgs. of opium. On 
the same day, Ravandi attended the CBSA Air Cargo 
Centre  to collect the  shipment. He was told that it 
would take a number of days for the shipment to 
clear and that he would be contacted to re-attend 
for pick  up. Two days later, Ravandi unexpectedly 
returned to the CBSA Air Cargo Centre to collect 
the shipment. He was invited by a CBSA officer to 
wait in a small café adjacent to the CBSA Air Cargo 
Centre  for his packages to be readied. Surveillance 
officers saw a second man, the accused, seated in 
the café at the  same time. Both Ravandi and the 
accused were typing  on their handheld devices but 
did not speak or appear to acknowledge one 
another. Ravandi exited the  café followed shortly 
thereafter by the accused. The accused was seen 
getting into a Honda Civic and drove away from 
the CBSA Air Cargo Centre
Ravandi returned to the  CBSA Air Cargo Centre 
with a U-Haul van to collect the shipment. The four 
packages were loaded into the van and he  drove 
away, followed by police. Ravandi eventually 
pulled over and parked his vehicle. He appeared to 
have his head down, sending text messages on his 
phone but he did not exit the van. Minutes later, he 
did a U-turn and drove back down the street. He 
parked in front of a building associated with the 
Honda’s licence plate. The accused was then 
observed standing near the Honda across the street 
from where  the van was parked. The police 
watched the two men load one of the packages 
from the  van into the Honda. Both men then got 
into the Honda and the accused drove it away. The 
accused parked a  block or two away from Ravandi’s 
residence. Ravandi got out and began walking 
towards his building  while  the accused stayed in 
the car. When the accused drove 
around to the back alley of 
Ravandi’s building, the sergeant 
stopped the Honda and arrested 
the accused for importing a 
controlled substance. Another 
officer was directed to search the 
Honda and found 13.787 kgs. of 
opium in three coolers located 
underneath a blanket in the trunk 
of the Honda.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge held that the Sergeant 
subjectively believed that he had 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
arrest the accused. As well, the judge 
considered the totality of the circumstances and 
concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the 
sergeant to have believed that he had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the accused for importing opium. 
The arrest was lawful, the drug-related evidence 
was admitted and the accused was convicted of 
possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking and 
sentenced to three years in prison.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
sergeant did not have the 
necessary reasonable grounds 
to arrest him without a warrant 
under s. 495 of the Criminal Code. In his view, the 
sergeant’s subjective belief was not objectively 
reasonable. Thus, he was arbitrarily detained and 
the search of his vehicle  was unreasonable under s. 
8 of the Charter. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that there  was abundant evidence to 
support the officer’s subjective belief as being 
objectively reasonable. 
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
In this case, the Court of Appeal found there was 
no question whether the sergeant subjectively 
believed he had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused for importing opium. As for the objective 
element of the test, Justice Fitch stated:
The reasonable grounds standard requires 
something more than mere suspicion, but 
something less than the standard applicable in 
civil matters of proof on the balance of 
probabilities. The appropriate standard is one of 
reasonable probability. Reasonable or credibly-
based probability contemplates a practical, 
non-technical and common sense evaluation of 
the probability of the existence of facts and 
asserted inferences.
Determining whether reasonable and probable 
grounds exist requires an assessment of the 
“totality of the circumstances”. 
[...]
Trial judges are obliged to assess the objective 
reasonableness of an arresting officer’s belief 
that he or she had reasonable grounds to arrest 
from the perspective of a reasonable person 
standing in the arresting officer’s shoes. The 
analysis takes account of the arresting officer’s 
knowledge and experience with respect to the 
matter under investigation. [references omitted, 
paras. 39-42]
Here, the sergeant weighed the totality of the 
information he had before deciding to arrest the 
accused for importing opium. And the trial judge 
did not overemphasize the reliability of the tipster’s 
information. Justice Fitch stated:
Although nothing was known of the tipster’s 
history of reliability, the information supplied 
by the informer was rich in detail and 
confirmed in material ways. In these 
circumstances, it was reasonable for [the 
sergeant] to regard the tip as a whole as 
reliable, including information that a second 
man was involved in importing opium from 
Iran. Indeed, this information could reasonably 
be regarded as having been confirmed by the 
[accused’s] conduct the day Mr.  Salamat 
Ravandi took delivery of shipment. [para. 48]
Furthermore, it was reasonable for the Sergeant to 
believe that the package transferred to the Honda 
contained opium. He was not required to consider 
other innocent explanations for the accused’s 
behaviour. “The trial judge was not obliged to 
scrutinize the evidence by employing tests 
applicable to the determination of guilt or 
innocence,” said Justice Fitch. He continued:
She was not obliged to rule out every possible 
innocent inference for suspicious activity in 
determining whether [the sergeant’s] grounds 
for arrest were objectively reasonable. Rather, 
she was obliged to consider the totality of the 
circumstances relied upon by [the sergeant] 
and decide whether a reasonable person 
standing in the arresting officer’s shoes and 
imbued with that officer’s knowledge and 
experience would have believed that 
reasonable grounds existed to make the arrest. 
[para. 52]
“The reasonable grounds standard requires something more than mere suspicion, but 
something less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of 
probabilities.”
“Determining whether reasonable and 
probable grounds exist requires an 
assessment of the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’.”
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The Court of Appeal agreed that the totality of the 
circumstances known to the sergeant at the time of 
the arrest made it objectively reasonable for him to 
believe that the man driving the Honda was the 
second person identified by the tipster as being 
involved with Ravandi in importing opium from 
Iran to Canada. Since the arrest of the accused was 
lawful, the search of the vehicle was justified as an 
incident to the arrest. The accused’s Charter  rights 
were not breached and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
INTEL FILE INFORMATION 
INSIGNIFICANT: ARREST 
UNLAWFUL  
R. v. Ngai, 2017 ABCA 199
 
A vehicle passed a police car that 
was stopped at the side of the road. 
The officer, in company an auxiliary 
constable, thought the vehicle 
passed by too close and too fast. The 
officer stopped the car driven by the accused to 
discuss safety matters about how to pass an 
emergency vehicle and to possibly give him a ticket 
for passing too closely and too quickly. The 
auxiliary went to talk  to the accused while  the 
officer worked on his computer. When the  officer 
approached the vehicle he heard the accused 
telling the auxiliary that he had been visiting his 
girlfriend in Calgary where she was writing 
university exams.   The accused presented a rental 
agreement for the car and the officer saw three cell 
phones in it. The officer also recognized a 
distinctive  pattern on the accused’s wallet. He had 
arrested another person with a  similar wallet a year 
earlier for drug possession. That person also drove a 
similar car (make, model and colour) and had 
similar cell phones. The accused was also 
extremely nervous. He was breathing heavily and 
was shaking when he presented his documents. The 
officer saw there was no luggage visible  and the 
accused was wearing no shoes.  
The officer went back to his police car. He had 
taken a pipeline training course in detecting drug 
traffickers and felt drug  traffickers liked to use rental 
cars so there would be no registration information 
from the licence plate that could assist the police in 
checking on the driver. As well, it was difficult to 
put a tracking device on a rental car. The officer felt 
the fast food in the car indicated a  driver who did 
not want to stop long to eat, since that would leave 
the car, and presumably its illegal cargo, 
unattended.   Not wearing shoes showed a person 
who wanted to be comfortable on a long  trip.   The 
officer also had a  girlfriend at university and 
thought that exams were  over. The computer check 
on the accused said that he was somehow involved 
in the Saskatoon drug trade.
The officer went back  to the accused’s car to ask 
questions and confirm some information. The 
accused now said that he was the one writing 
exams and said that he had a rental car because his 
brother’s car, which he usually drove, had been in 
an accident. The officer conducted more computer 
checks and no report of an accident involving the 
brother’s car was found.  The officer arrested the 
accused for possessing a controlled substance. This 
occurred about 30 minutes after the stop. The 
accused was also advised of his right to counsel 
and asked if he could call a lawyer before the car 
was searched. The officer said that he could call a 
lawyer but that the car was still going to be 
searched.  The officer opened the trunk of the rental 
car and saw a large  box. When he said  that he bet 
that there was weed in the box, the accused 
nodded and said, “Yeah”. The officer opened the 
box and found five pounds of marijuana.  The 
accused was again arrested and told that he could 
“Trial judges are obliged to assess the 
objective reasonableness of an arresting 
officer’s belief that he or she had 
reasonable grounds to arrest from the 
perspective of a reasonable person 
standing in the arresting officer’s shoes. 
The analysis takes account of the arresting 
officer’s knowledge and experience with 
respect to the matter under investigation.”
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call a lawyer at the police station. He was then 
taken to the police station where he spoke to a 
lawyer, almost 3 1/2 hours after the stop. The 
accused was charged with possessing marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The accused argued that he was 
improperly detained at the roadside 
from the time of the stop until he was 
arrested.  During this time he was not 
told of the reason for his detention nor of his right 
to counsel. He also suggested that that his right to 
contact counsel was further violated when he was 
not afforded a chance to call counsel at the scene 
of the stop, despite his request to do so. As well, he 
submitted that there were  insufficient grounds to 
search the vehicle. The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the accused was properly  stopped 
for a traffic infraction and that his detention was 
properly related to the stop and then to the 
suspicion that he was carrying  drugs.  The Crown 
maintained that the officer had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the accused and that the 
search was properly incidental to arrest. Finally, the 
Crown argued that there was no realistic 
opportunity for the accused to call counsel at the 
roadside and that any delay in calling a lawyer had 
no practical effect on the obtaining of evidence.
Before the judge considered each of the factors 
(either individually or in their totality) the officer 
used to support his grounds for believing that the 
accused was transporting drugs, he determined that 
some of the observations were made in violation of 
the accused’s Charter rights. The judge found the 
accused was properly stopped for a perceived 
infraction of provincial traffic rules but that the 
reason for detention changed to a far more serious 
criminal investigation when the officer went back 
to the accused the second time. By then the officer 
knew that the accused’s licence was valid and that 
the car was rented. He had enough information to 
issue a traffic ticket or to discuss the accused’s 
driving with him. But he was suspicious that there 
was contraband in the vehicle and he wanted to 
confirm some information before arresting  the 
accused. 
The accused should have been told about the 
change in the investigation. “Answering questions 
about a speeding ticket is obviously very different 
than answering questions that might lead to a very 
serious criminal charge,” said the judge. “A 
detainee should know of this charge so he can 
make an informed decision about his course of 
conduct.” The accused’s right to know of the reason 
for his detention was violated when the officer 
went back to the car the second time, intending to 
ask questions that could lead to serious criminal 
charges. The judge excluded the facts learned on 
the second visit to the car  from the evidence, those 
being the  reason for being in Calgary and the 
reason for being in a rented car. 
As for the officer’s grounds, the judge dismissed the 
perceived similarities (wallet, car and phones) 
between the accused and someone else the officer 
had arrested one year earlier for drug offences as 
lacking significance. As for the story about the 
girlfriend in Calgary, the rental vehicle and the 
eating of food in the car, these factors were not 
enough to justify the arrest although they may have 
had value to the officer. The judge, however, found 
the computer check was significant and the 
reported nervousness of the accused was highly 
relevant. “The  last two factors are extremely 
important and, when taken together with the  other 
factors were sufficient, in my view, to give the 
officer reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the accused was carrying drugs and to arrest 
him for that offence,” said the judge. Since the 
arrest was lawful, the search incidental to the arrest 
was reasonable. There was no s. 8 Charter breach. 
Although there was a s. 10(b) breach following his 
arrest because the police did not let him call 
counsel at the roadside, the judge found “the 
accused has no right to expect the police to delay 
their search until he spoke to counsel.” The right of 
the police to search was not dependent on the 
accused’s consent. Therefore, the judge concluded 
there  was “no logical connection between the 
accused’s thwarted right to call counsel from 
roadside and the police  right to search the vehicle.” 
The evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted of possessing marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
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The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding that 
the officer had the required 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest him. Without a valid arrest, he 
suggested that the search that followed was 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and the 
evidence ought to have been excluded.
As for the officer’s belief in this case, the  Court of 
Appeal concluded that trial judge erred in 
determining it was objectively reasonable. There 
were concerns with the two factors that the trial 
judge relied quite heavily: (1) the  computer check 
and (2) the accused’s nervousness.
Computer Check
The officer’s evidence  that the computer check 
revealed the accused was listed on an intel file 
regarding drug activity was weak. The officer did 
not look into this intel further and provided no 
detail. Justice Martin stated:
[The officer] said he eventually accessed the 
system and learned that the accused’s name 
was “listed in regards to drug activity in 
Saskatoon and that’s all I’m going to say on 
that”. He said that he did not do anything 
further because the listing of [the accused’s] 
name on an intel file was all he needed to 
know. [The officer] could not speak to the 
particulars of how [the accused] was involved 
or the basis for anybody’s belief in placing such 
information onto the system where it was 
accessed by [the officer]. [The officer’s] general 
assertion was unsupported by any screenshot or 
document outlining what specific information 
he relied upon. Disclosure was requested, but 
not provided, and any cross-examination was 
necessarily limited by the absence of any 
documentary records as well as [the officer] 
stating that he did not know what was in that 
file. [The officer] simply stated that it referred to 
the accused. Relying on internal information 
systems may supply the type of hearsay 
statement that could go to [the officer’s] 
subjective belief, but more is needed when 
assessing the objective reasonableness of that 
belief.
There is no basis on which to test the reliability 
of the information in that system or even [the 
officer’s] recollection of it without further 
evidence. The notion that people may be 
arrested because their names are mentioned on 
an undisclosed information system would be a 
startling development indeed. This is especially 
so since [the officer] also did not seem to have 
taken into account the countervailing facts that 
[the accused] had no criminal record and no 
traffic violations. [paras. 7-8]
Nervousness
As for nervousness, the Court of Appeal determined 
it should not have been given the weight ascribed 
to it by the trial judge:
[The officer] also stated that innocent people 
who are stopped may be nervous at first but 
then relax, whereas this accused maintained his 
nervousness or it increased. He pointed to [the 
accused’s] hands shaking and that he breathed 
fast and deeply and stuttered. [The officer] also 
said that [the accused] denied that he was 
driving too fast or too close and was defensive 
about being stopped at all. The stop took much 
longer than normal, indeed half an hour, and 
the accused was asked many different 
questions. In such circumstances, nervousness 
might be expected and it does not appear to 
amount to sufficiently probative evidence to 
ground an objective and reasonable and 
probable grounds for arrest on drug charges. 
[para. 9]
Admissibility
Without sufficient grounds for the  arrest, it was 
unlawful and the incidental search of the vehicle 
was unreasonable. Since the Crown conceded that 
an unlawful arrest would result in the exclusion of 
drugs, the accused’s appeal was allowed, his 
conviction was quashed, and an acquittal was 
entered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Ngia, 2014 ABPC 80.
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